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The Lurid Interval
We have seen that during Frontenac's first term of
office no urgent danger menaced the colony on the frontier. The
missionary and the explorer were steadily pressing forward to the
head of the Great Lakes and into the valley of the Mississippi,
enlarging the sphere of French influence and rendering the interior
tributary to the commerce of Quebec. But this peaceful and silent
expansion had not passed unnoticed by those in whose minds it
aroused both rivalry and dread. Untroubled from without as New
France had been under Frontenac, there were always two lurking
perils--the Iroquois and the English.
The Five Nations owed their leadership among the Indian tribes not
only to superior discipline and method but also to their
geographical situation. The valley of the St Lawrence lay within
easy reach, either through Lake Champlain or Lake Ontario. On the
east at their very door lay the valley of the Mohawk and the Hudson.
From the western fringe of their territory they could advance
quickly to Lake Erie, or descend the Ohio into the valley of the
Mississippi. It was doubtless due to their prowess rather than to
accident that they originally came into possession of this central
and favored position; however, they could now make their force felt
throughout the whole north-eastern portion of the continent.
Over seventy years had now passed since Champlain's attack upon the
Iroquois in 1609; but lapse of time had not altered the nature of
the savage, nor were the causes of mutual hostility less real than
at first. A ferocious lust for war remained the deepest passion of
the Iroquois, to be satisfied at convenient intervals. It was
unfortunate, in their view, that they could not always be at war;
but they recognized that there must be breathing times and that it
was important to choose the right moment for massacre and pillage.
Daring but sagacious, they followed an opportunist policy. At times
their warriors delighted to lurk in the outskirts of Montreal with
tomahawk and scalping-knife and to organize great war-parties, such
as that which was arrested by Dollard and his heroic companions at
the Long Sault in 1660. At other times they held fair speech with
the governor and permitted the Jesuits to live in their villages,
for the French had weapons and means of fighting which inspired
respect.
The appearance of the Dutch on the Hudson in 1614 was an event of
great importance to the Five Nations. The Dutch were quite as ready
as the French to trade in furs, and it was thus that the Iroquois
first procured the firearms which they used in their raids on the
French settlements. That the Iroquois rejoiced at having a European
colony on the Hudson may be doubted, but as they were unable to
prevent it, they drew what profit they could by putting the French
and Dutch in competition, both for their alliance and their
neutrality.
But, though the Dutch were heretics and rivals, it was a bad day for
New France when the English seized New Amsterdam (1669) and began to
establish themselves from Manhattan to Albany. The inevitable
conflict was first foreshadowed in the activities of Sir Edmund
Andros, which followed his appointment as governor of New York in
1674. He visited the Mohawks in their own villages, organized a
board of Indian commissioners at Albany, and sought to cement an
alliance with the whole confederacy of the Five Nations. In
opposition to this France made the formal claim (1677) that by
actual residence in the Iroquois country the Jesuits had brought the
Iroquois under French sovereignty.
Iroquois, French, and English thus formed the points of a political
triangle. Home politics, however--the friendship of Stuart and
Bourbon--tended to postpone the day of reckoning between the English
and French in America. England and France were not only at peace but
in alliance. The Treaty of Dover had been signed in 1670, and two
years later, just as Frontenac had set out for Quebec, Charles II
had sent a force of six thousand English to aid Louis XIV against
the Dutch. It was in this war that John Churchill, afterwards Duke
of Marlborough, won his spurs--fighting on the French side!
None the less, there were premonitions of trouble in America,
especially after Thomas Dongan became governor of New York in 1683.
Andros had shown good judgment in his dealings with the Iroquois,
and his successor, inheriting a sound policy, went even further on
the same course. Dongan, an Irishman of high birth and a Catholic,
strenuously opposed the pretensions of the French to sovereignty
over the Iroquois. When it was urged that religion required the
presence of the Jesuits among them, he denied the allegation,
stating that he would provide English priests to take their place. A
New England Calvinist could not have shown more firmness in
upholding the English position. Indeed, no governor of Puritan New
England had ever equaled Dongan in hostility to Catholic New France.
Frontenac's successor, Lefebvre de la Barre, who had served with
distinction in the West Indies, arrived at Quebec in September 1682.
By the same ship came the new intendant, Meulles. They found the
Lower Town of Quebec in ruins, for a devastating fire had just swept
through it. Hardly anything remained standing save the buildings on
the cliff.
La Barre and Meulles were soon at loggerheads. It appears that,
instead of striving to repair the effects of the fire, the new
governor busied himself to accumulate fortune. He had indeed
promised the king that, unlike his predecessors, he would seek no
profit from private trading, and had on this ground requested an
increase of salary. Meulles presently reported that, far from
keeping this promise, La Barre and his agents had shared ten or
twelve thousand crowns of profit, and that unless checked the
governor's revenues would soon exceed those of the king. Meulles
also accuses La Barre of sending home deceitful reports regarding
the success of his Indian policy. We need not dwell longer on these
reports. They disclose with great clearness the opinion of the
intendant as to the governor's fitness for his office.
La Barre stands condemned not by the innuendoes of Meulles, but by
his own failure to cope with the Iroquois.
The presence of the Dutch and English had stimulated the Five
Nations to enlarge their operations in the fur trade and multiply
their profits. The French, from being earliest in the field, had
established friendly relations with all the tribes to the north of
the Great Lakes, including those who dwelt in the valley of the
Ottawa; and La Salle and Tonty had recently penetrated to the
Mississippi and extended French trade to the country of the Illinois
Indians. The furs from this region were being carried up the
Mississippi and forwarded to Quebec by the Lakes and the St
Lawrence. This brought the Illinois within the circle of tribes
commercially dependent on Quebec. At the same time the Iroquois,
through the English on the Hudson, now possessed facilities greater
than ever for disposing of all the furs they could acquire; and they
wanted this trade for themselves.
The wholesome respect which the Iroquois entertained for Frontenac
kept them from attacking the tribes under the protection of the
French on the Great Lakes; but the remote Illinois were thought to
be a safe prey. During the autumn of 1680 a war-party of more than
six hundred Iroquois invaded the country of the Illinois. La Salle
was then in Montreal, but Tonty met the invaders and did all he
could to save the Illinois from their clutches. His efforts were in
vain. The Illinois suffered all that had befallen the Huron in 1649.1
The Iroquois, however, were careful not to harm the French, and to
demand from Tonty a letter to show Frontenac as proof that he and
his companions had been respected.
Obviously this raid was a symptom of danger, and in 1681 Frontenac
asked the king to send him five or six hundred troops. A further
disturbing incident occurred at the Jesuit mission of Sault Ste
Marie, where an Illinois Indian murdered a Seneca chieftain. That
Frontenac intended to act with firmness towards the Iroquois, while
giving them satisfaction for the murder of their chief, is clear
from his acts in 1681 no less than from his general record. But his
forces were small and he had received particular instructions to
reduce expenditure. And, with Duchesneau at hand to place a sinister
interpretation upon his every act, the conditions were not favorable
for immediate action. Then in 1682 he was recalled.
Such, in general, were the conditions which confronted La Barre, and
in fairness it must be admitted that they were the most serious thus
far in the history of Canada. From the first the Iroquois had been a
pest and a menace, but now, with the English to flatter and
encourage them, they became a grave peril. The total population of
the colony was now about ten thousand, of whom many were women and
children. The regular troops were very few; and, though the
disbanded Carignan soldiers furnished the groundwork of a valiant
militia, the habitants and their seigneurs alone could not be
expected to defend such a territory against such a foe.
Above all else the situation demanded strong leadership; and this
was precisely what La Barre failed to supply. He was preoccupied
with the profits of the fur trade, ignorant of Indian character, and
past his physical prime; and his policy towards the Iroquois was a
continuous series of blunders. Through the great personal influence
of Charles Le Moyne the Five Nations were induced, in 1683, to send
representatives to Montreal, where La Barre met them and gave them
lavish presents. The Iroquois, always good judges of character, did
not take long to discover in the new governor a very different
Onontio from the imposing personage who had held conference with
them at Fort Frontenac ten years earlier.
The feebleness of La Barre's effort to maintain French sovereignty
over the Iroquois is reflected in his request that they should ask
his permission before attacking tribes friendly to the French. When
he asked them why they had attacked the Illinois, they gave this
ominous answer: 'Because they deserved to die.' La Barre could
effect nothing by a display of authority, and even with the help of
gifts he could only postpone war against the tribes of the Great
Lakes. The Iroquois intimated that for the present they would be
content to finish the destruction of the Illinois--a work which
would involve the destruction of the French posts in the valley of
the Mississippi. La Barre's chief purpose was to protect his own
interests as a trader, and, so far from wishing to strengthen La
Salle's position on the Mississippi, he looked upon that illustrious
explorer as a competitor whom it was legitimate to destroy by craft.
By an act of poetic justice the Iroquois a few months later
plundered a convoy of canoes which La Barre himself had sent out to
the Mississippi for trading purposes.
The season of 1684 proved even less prosperous for the French. Not
only Dongan was doing his best to make the Iroquois allies of the
English; Lord Howard of Effingham, the governor of Virginia, was
busy to the same end. For some time past certain tribes of the Five
Nations, though not the confederacy as a whole, had been making
forays upon the English settlers in Maryland and even in Virginia.
To adjust this matter Lord Howard came to Albany in person, held a
council which was attended by representatives of all the tribes, and
succeeded in effecting a peace. Amid the customary ceremonies the
Five Nations buried the hatchet with the English, and stood ready to
concentrate their war-parties upon the French.
It must not be inferred that by an act of reconciliation these
subtle savages threw themselves into the arms of the English,
exchanging a new suzerainty for an old. They always did the best
they could for their own hand, seeking to play one white man against
the other for their own advantage. It was a situation where, on the
part of French and English, individual skill and knowledge of Indian
character counted for much. On the one hand, Dongan showed great
intelligence and activity in making the most of the fact that Albany
was nearer to the land of the Five Nations than Quebec, or even
Montreal. On the other, the French had envoys who stood high in the
esteem of the Iroquois--notably Charles Le Moyne, of Longueuil, and
Lamberville, the Jesuit missionary.
But for the moment the French were heavily burdened by the venality
of La Barre, who subordinated public policy to his own gains. We
have now to record his most egregious blunder--an attempt to overawe
the Iroquois with an insufficient force--an attempt which Meulles
declared was a mere piece of acting--not designed for real war on
behalf of the colony, but to assist the governor's private interests
as a trader. From whatever side the incident is viewed it
illustrates a complete incapacity.
On July 10, 1684, La Barre left Quebec with a body of two hundred
troops. In ascending the river they were reinforced by recruits from
the Canadian militia and several hundred Indian allies. After much
hardship in the rapids the little army reached Fort Frontenac. Here
the sanitary conditions proved bad and many died from malarial
fever. All thought of attack soon vanished, and La Barre altered his
plans and decided to invite the Iroquois to a council. The degree of
his weakness may be seen from the fact that he began with a
concession regarding the place of meeting. An embassy from the
Onondagas finally condescended to meet him, but not at Fort
Frontenac. La Barre, with a force such as he could muster, crossed
to the south side of Lake Ontario and met the delegates from the
Iroquois at La Famine, at the mouth of the Salmon River, not far
from the point where Champlain and the Huron had left their canoes
when they had invaded the Onondaga country in 1615.
The council which ensued was a ghastly joke. La Barre began his
speech by enumerating the wrongs which the French and their
dependent tribes had recently suffered from the Iroquois. Among
these he included the raid upon the Illinois, the machinations with
the English, and the spoliation of French traders. For offences so
heinous satisfaction must be given. Otherwise Onontio would declare
a war in which the English would join him. These were brave words,
but unfortunately the Iroquois had excellent reason to believe that
the statement regarding the English was untrue, and could see for
themselves the weakness of La Barre's forces.
This conference has been picturesquely described by Baron La Hontan,
who was present and records the speeches. The chief orator of the
Onondagas was a remarkable person, who either for his eloquence or
aspect is called by La Hontan, Grangula, or Big Mouth. Having
listened to La Barre's bellicose words and their interpretation, 'he
rose, took five or six turns in the ring that the French and the
savages formed, and returned to his place. Then standing upright he
spoke after the following manner to the General La Barre, who sat in
his chair of state:
'Onontio, I honor you, and all the warriors that accompany me do the
same. Your interpreter has made an end of his discourse, and now I
come to begin mine. My voice glides to your ear. Pray listen to my
words.
'Onontio, in setting out from Quebec, you must have fancied that the
scorching beams of the sun had burnt down the forests which render
our country inaccessible to the French; or else that the inundations
of the lake had surrounded our cottages and confined us as
prisoners. This certainly was your thought; and it could be nothing
else but the curiosity of seeing a burnt or drowned country that
moved you to undertake a journey hither. But now you have an
opportunity of being undeceived, for I and my warriors come to
assure you that the Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, and Mohawk are
not yet destroyed. I return you thanks in their name for bringing
into their country the calumet of peace, which your predecessor
received from their hands. At the same time I congratulate you on
having left under ground the tomahawk which has so often been dyed
with the blood of the French. I must tell you, Onontio, that I am
not asleep. My eyes are open, and the sun which vouchsafes the light
gives me a clear view of a great captain at the head of a troop of
soldiers, who speaks as if he were asleep. He pretends that he does
not approach this lake with any other view than to smoke the calumet
with the Onondagas. But Grangula knows better. He sees plainly that
Onontio meant to knock them on the head if the French arms had not
been so much weakened...
'You must know, Onontio, that we have robbed no Frenchman, save
those who supplied the Illinois and the Miamis (our enemies) with
muskets, powder, and ball... We have conducted the English to our
lakes in order to trade with the Ottawa and the Huron; just as the
Algonquins. conducted the French to our five cantons, in order to
carry on a commerce that the English lay claim to as their right. We
are born freemen and have no dependence either upon the Onontio or
the Corlaer [the English governor]. We have power to go where we
please, to conduct whom we will to the places we resort to, and to
buy and sell where we think fit... We fell upon the Illinois and the
Miami because they cut down the trees of peace that served for
boundaries and came to hunt beavers upon our lands. ...We have done
less than the English and French, who without any right have usurped
the lands they are now possessed of.
'I give you to know, Onontio, that my voice is the voice of the five
Iroquois cantons. This is their answer. Pray incline your ear and
listen to what they represent.
'The Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, and Mohawks declare that they
buried the tomahawk in the presence of your predecessor, in the very
centre of the fort, and planted the Tree of Peace in the same place.
It was then stipulated that the fort should be used as a place of
retreat for merchants and not a refuge for soldiers. Be it known to
you, Onontio, that so great a number of soldiers, being shut up in
so small a fort, do not stifle and choke the Tree of Peace. Since it
took root so easily it would be evil to stop its growth and hinder
it from shading both your country and ours with its leaves. I assure
you, in the name of the five nations, that our warriors will dance
the calumet dance under its branches and will never dig up the axe
to cut it down--till such time as the Onontio and the Corlaer do
separately or together invade the country which the Great Spirit
gave to our ancestors.'2
When Le Moyne and the Jesuits had interpreted this speech La Barre
'retired to his tent and stormed and blustered.' But Grangula
favored the spectators with an Iroquois dance, after which he
entertained several of the Frenchmen at a banquet. 'Two days later,'
writes La Hontan, 'he and his warriors returned to their own
country, and our army set out for Montreal. As soon as the General
was on board, together with the few healthy men that remained, the
canoes were dispersed, for the militia straggled here and there, and
every one made the best of his way home.'
With this ignominious adventure the career of La Barre ends. The
reports which Meulles sent to France produced a speedy effect in
securing his dismissal from office. 'I have been informed,' politely
writes the king, 'that your years do not permit you to support the
fatigues inseparable from your office of governor and
lieutenant-general in Canada.'
La Barre's successor, the Marquis de Denonville, arrived at Quebec
in August 1685. Like La Barre, he was a soldier; like Frontenac, he
was an aristocrat as well. From both these predecessors, however, he
differed in being free from the reproach of using his office to
secure personal profits through the fur trade. No governor in all
the annals of New France was on better terms with the bishop and the
Jesuits. He possessed great bravery. There is much to show that he
was energetic. None the less he failed, and his failure was more
glaring than that of La Barre. He could not hold his ground against
the Iroquois and the English.
It has been pointed out already that when La Barre assumed office
the problems arising from these two sources were more difficult than
at any previous date; but the situation which was serious in 1682
and had become critical by 1685 grew desperate in the four years of
Denonville's sway. The one overshadowing question of this period was
the Iroquois peril, rendered more and more acute by the policy of
the English.
The greatest mistake which Denonville made in his dealings with the
Iroquois was to act deceitfully. The savages could be perfidious
themselves, but they were not without a conception of honor and felt
genuine respect for a white man whose word they could trust.
Denonville, who in his private life displayed many virtues, seemed
to consider that he was justified in acting towards the savages as
the exigency of the moment prompted. Apart from all considerations
of morality this was bad judgment.
In his dealings with the English Denonville had little more success
than in his dealings with the Indians. Dongan was a thorn in his
side from the first, although their correspondence opened, on both
sides, with the language of compliment. A few months later its tone
changed, particularly after Dongan heard that Denonville intended to
build a fort at Niagara. Against a project so unfriendly Dongan
protested with emphasis. In reply Denonville disclaimed the
intention, at the same time alleging that Dongan was giving shelter
at Albany to French deserters. A little later they reach the point
of sarcasm. Denonville taxes Dongan with selling rum to the Indians.
Dongan retorts that at least English rum is less unwholesome than
French brandy. Beneath these epistolary compliments there lies the
broad fact that Dongan stood firm by his principle that the
extension of French rule to the south of Lake Ontario should not be
tolerated: He ridicules the basis of French pretensions, saying that
Denonville might as well claim China because there are Jesuits at
the Chinese court. The French, he adds, have no more right to the
country because its streams flow into Lake Ontario than they have to
the lands of those who drink claret or brandy. It is clear that
Dongan fretted under the restrictions which were imposed upon him by
the friendship between England and France. He would have welcomed an
order to support his arguments by force. Denonville, on his side,
with like feelings, could not give up the claim to suzerainty over
the land of the Iroquois.
The domain of the Five Nations was not the only part of America
where French and English clashed. The presence of the English in
Hudson Bay excited deep resentment at Quebec and Montreal. Here
Denonville ventured to break the peace as Dongan had not dared to
do. With Denonville's consent and approval, a band of Canadians left
Montreal in the spring of 1686, fell upon three of the English
posts--Fort Hayes, Fort Rupert, Fort Albany--and with some bloodshed
dispossessed their garrisons. Well satisfied with this exploit,
Denonville in 1687 turned his attention to the chastisement of the
Iroquois.
The forces which he brought together for this task were greatly
superior to any that had been mustered in Canada before. Not only
were they adequate in numbers, but they comprised an important band
of coureurs de bois, headed by La Durantaye, Tonty, Du Lhut, and
Nicolas Perrot--men who equaled the Indians in woodcraft and
surpassed them in character. The epitaph of Denonville as a governor
is written in the failure of this great expedition to accomplish its
purpose.
The first blunder occurred at Fort Frontenac before mobilization had
been completed. There were on the north shore of Lake Ontario two
Iroquois villages, whose inhabitants had been in part baptized by
the Sulpicians and were on excellent terms with the garrison of the
fort. In a moment of insane stupidity Denonville decided that the
men of these settlements should be captured and sent to France as
galley slaves. Through the ruse of a banquet they were brought
together and easily seized. By dint of a little further effort two
hundred Iroquois of all ages and both sexes were collected at Fort
Frontenac as prisoners--and some at least perished by torture. But,
when executing this dastardly plot, Denonville did not succeed in
catching all the friendly Iroquois who lived in the neighborhood of
his fort. Enough escaped to carry the authentic tale to the Five
Nations, and after that there could be no peace till there had been
revenge. Worst of all, the French stood convicted of treachery and
falseness.
Having thus blighted his cause at the outset, Denonville proceeded
with his more serious task of smiting the Iroquois in their own
country. Considering the extent and expense of his preparations, he
should have planned a complete destruction of their power. Instead
of this he attempted no more than an attack upon the Seneca, whose
operations against the Illinois and in other quarters had made them
especially objectionable. The composite army of French and Indians
assembled at Irondequoit Bay on July 12--a force brought together at
infinite pains and under circumstances which might never occur
again. Marching southwards they fought a trivial battle with the
Seneca, in which half a dozen on the French side were killed, while
the Seneca are said to have lost about a hundred in killed and
wounded. The rest of the tribe took to the woods. As a result of
this easy victory the triumphant allies destroyed an Iroquois
village and all the corn which it contained, but the political
results of the expedition were worse than nothing. Denonville made
no attempt to destroy the other nations of the confederacy.
Returning to Lake Ontario he built a fort at Niagara, which he had
promised Dongan he would not do, and then returned to Montreal. The
net results of this portentous effort were a broken promise to the
English, an act of perfidy towards the Iroquois, and an
insignificant success in battle.
In 1688 Denonville's decision to abandon Fort Niagara slightly
changed the situation. The garrison had suffered severe losses
through illness and the post proved too remote for successful
defense. So this matter settled itself. The same season saw the
recall of Dongan through the consolidation of New England, New York,
and New Jersey under Sir Edmund Andros. But in essentials there was
no change. Andros continued Dongan's policy, of which, in fact, he
himself had been the author. And, even though no longer threatened
by the French from Niagara, the savages had reason enough to hate
and distrust Denonville.
Yet despite these untoward circumstances all hope of peace between
the French and the Five Nations had not been destroyed. The Iroquois
loved their revenge and were willing to wait for it, but caution
warned them that it would not be advantageous to destroy the French
for the benefit of the English. Moreover, in the long course o their
relations with the French they had, as already mentioned, formed a
high opinion of men like Le Moyne and Lamberville, while they viewed
with respect the exploits of Tonty, La Durantaye, and Du Lhut.
Moved by these considerations and a love of presents, Grangula, of
the Onondagas, was in the midst of negotiations for peace with the
French, which might have ended happily but for the stratagem of the
Huron chief Kondiaronk, called 'The Rat.' The remnant of Huron and
the other tribes centering at Michilimackinac did not desire a peace
of the French and Iroquois which would not include themselves, for
this would mean their own certain destruction. The Iroquois, freed
of the French, would surely fall on the Huron. All the Indians
distrusted Denonville, and Kondiaronk suspected, with good reason,
that the Huron were about to be sacrificed. Denonville, however, had
assured Kondiaronk that there was to be war to the death against the
Iroquois, and on this understanding he went with a band of warriors
to Fort Frontenac. There he learned that peace would be concluded
between Onontio and the Onondagas--in other words, that the Iroquois
would soon be free to attack the Huron and their allies. To avert
this threatened destruction of his own people, he set out with his
warriors and lay in ambush for a party of Onondaga chiefs who were
on their way to Montreal. Having killed one and captured almost all
the rest, he announced to his Iroquois prisoners that he had
received orders from Denonville to destroy them. When they explained
that they were ambassadors, he feigned surprise and said he could no
longer be an accomplice to the wickedness of the French. Then he
released them all save one, in order that they might carry home this
tale of Denonville's second treachery. The one Iroquois Kondiaronk
retained on the plea that he wished to adopt him. Arrived at
Michilimackinac, he handed over the captive to the French there,
who, having heard nothing of the peace, promptly shot him. An
Iroquois prisoner, whom Kondiaronk secretly released for the
purpose, conveyed to the Five Nations word of this further atrocity.
The Iroquois prepared to deliver a hard blow. On August 5, 1689,
they fell in overwhelming force upon the French settlement at
Lachine. Those who died by the tomahawk were the most fortunate.
Charlevoix gives the number of victims at two hundred killed and one
hundred and twenty taken prisoner. Girouard's examination of parish
registers results in a lower estimate--namely, twenty-four killed at
Lachine and forty-two at La Chesnaye, a short time afterwards.
Whatever the number, it was the most dreadful catastrophe which the
colony had yet suffered.
Such were the events which, in seven years, had brought New France
to the brink of ruin. But she was not to perish from the Iroquois.
In October 1689 Frontenac returned to take Denonville's place.
1 See The Jesuit Missions in this
Series, chap. vi.
2 Grangula's speech is an example in part of Indian
eloquence, and in part of the eloquence of Baron La Hontan, who
contributes many striking passages to our knowledge of Frontenac's
period.
This site includes some historical materials that
may imply negative stereotypes reflecting the culture or language of
a particular period or place. These items are presented as part of
the historical record and should not be interpreted to mean that the
WebMasters in any way endorse the stereotypes implied.
Chronicles of Canada, The Fighting Governor, A
Chronicle of Frontenac, 1915
Chronicles of Canada |