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Peace without Honor
The war was brought to a virtual termination by the
surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown on October 19, 1781. The
definitive articles of peace were signed at Versailles on September
3, 1783. During the two years that intervened between these events,
the lot of the Loyalists was one of gloomy uncertainty. They found
it hard to believe that the British government would abandon them to
the mercy of their enemies; and yet the temper of the revolutionists
toward them continued such that there seemed little hope of
concession or conciliation. Success had not taught the rebels the
grace of forgiveness. At the capitulation of Yorktown, Washington
had refused to treat with the Loyalists in Cornwallis's army on the
same terms as with the British regulars; and Cornwallis had been
compelled to smuggle his Loyalist levies out of Yorktown on the ship
that carried the news of his surrender to New York. As late as 1782
fresh confiscation laws had been passed in Georgia and the
Carolinas; and in New York a law had been passed cancelling all
debts due to Loyalists, on condition that one-fortieth of the debt
was paid into the state treasury. These were straws which showed the
way the wind was blowing.
In the negotiations leading up to the Peace of Versailles there were
no clauses so long and bitterly discussed as those relating to the
Loyalists. The British commissioners stood out at first for the
principle of complete amnesty to them and restitution of all they
had lost; and it is noteworthy that the French minister added his
plea to theirs. But Benjamin Franklin and his colleagues refused to
agree to this formula. They took the ground that they, as the
representatives merely of the Continental Congress, had not the
right to bind the individual states in such a matter. The argument
was a quibble. Their real reason was that they were well aware that
public opinion in America would not support them in such a
concession. A few enlightened men in America, such as John Adams,
favored a policy of compensation to the Loyalists, 'how little
soever they deserve it, nay, how much soever they deserve the
contrary'; but the attitude of the great majority of the Americans
had been clearly demonstrated by a resolution passed in the
legislature of Virginia on December 17, 1782, to the effect that all
demands for the restitution of confiscated property were wholly
inadmissible. Even some of the Loyalists had begun to realize that a
revolution which had touched property was bound to be permanent, and
that the American commissioners could no more give back to them
their confiscated lands than Charles II was able to give back to his
father's cavaliers the estates they had lost in the Civil War.
The American commissioners agreed, finally, that no future
confiscations should take place, that imprisoned Loyalists should be
released, that no further persecutions should be permitted, and that
creditors on either side should 'meet with no lawful impediment' to
the recovery of all good debts in sterling money. But with regard to
the British demand for restitution, all they could be induced to
sign was a promise that Congress would 'earnestly recommend to the
legislatures of the respective states' a policy of amnesty and
restitution.
In making this last recommendation, it is difficult not to convict
the American commissioners of something very like hypocrisy. There
seems to be no doubt that they knew the recommendation would not be
complied with; and little or no attempt was made by them to persuade
the states to comply with it. In after years the clause was
represented by the Americans as a mere form of words, necessary to
bring the negotiations to an end, and to save the face of the
British government. To this day it has remained, except in one or
two states, a dead letter. On the other hand it is impossible not to
convict the British commissioners of a betrayal of the Loyalists.
'Never,' said Lord North in the House of Commons, 'never was the
honor, the humanity, the principles, the policy of a nation so
grossly abused, as in the desertion of those men who are now exposed
to every punishment that desertion and poverty can inflict, because
they were not rebels.' 'In ancient or in modern history,' said Lord
Loughborough in the House of Lords, 'there cannot be found an
instance of so shameful a desertion of men who have sacrificed all
to their duty and to their reliance upon our faith.' It seems
probable that the British commissioners could have obtained, on
paper at any rate, better terms for the Loyalists. It is very
doubtful if the Americans would have gone to war again over such a
question. In 1783 the position of Great Britain was relatively not
weaker, but stronger, than in 1781, when hostilities had ceased. The
attitude of the French minister, and the state of the French
finances, made it unlikely that France would lend her support to
further hostilities. And there is no doubt that the American states
were even more sorely in need of peace than was Great Britain.
When the terms of peace were announced, great was the bitterness
among the Loyalists. One of them protested in Rivington's Gazette
that 'even robbers, murderers, and rebels are faithful to their
fellows and never betray each other,' and another sang,
'Tis an honor to serve the bravest of nations, And be left to be
hanged in their capitulations.
If the terms of the peace had been observed, the plight of the
Loyalists would have been bad enough. But as it was, the outcome
proved even worse. Every clause in the treaty relating to the
Loyalists was broken over and over again. There was no sign of an
abatement of the popular feeling against them; indeed, in some
places, the spirit of persecution seemed to blaze out anew. One of
Washington's bitterest sayings was uttered at this time, when he
said of the Loyalists that 'he could see nothing better for them
than to commit suicide.' Loyalist creditors found it impossible to
recover their debts in America, while they were themselves sued in
the British courts by their American creditors, and their property
was still being confiscated by the American legislatures. The
legislature of New York publicly declined to reverse its policy of
confiscation, on the ground that Great Britain had offered no
compensation for the property which her friends had destroyed.
Loyalists who ventured to return home under the treaty of peace were
insulted, tarred and feathered, whipped, and even ham-strung. All
over the country there were formed local committees or associations
with the object of preventing renewed intercourse with the Loyalists
and the restitution of Loyalist property. 'The proceedings of these
people,' wrote Sir Guy Carleton, 'are not to be attributed to
politics alone--it serves as a pretence, and under that cloak they
act more boldly, but avarice and a desire of rapine are the great
incentives.'
The Loyalists were even denied civil rights in most of the states.
In 1784 an act was passed in New York declaring that all who had
held office under the British, or helped to fit out vessels of war,
or who had served as privates or officers in the British Army, or
who had left the state, were guilty of 'misprision of treason,' and
were disqualified from both the franchise and public office. There
was in fact hardly a state in 1785 where the Loyalist was allowed to
vote. In New York Loyalist lawyers were not allowed to practice
until April 1786, and then only on condition of taking an 'oath of
abjuration and allegiance.' In the same state, Loyalists were
subjected to such invidious special taxation that in 1785 one of
them confessed that 'those in New York whose estates have not been
confiscated are so loaded with taxes and other grievances that there
is nothing left but to sell out and move into the protection of the
British government.'
It was clear that something would have to be done by the British
government for the Loyalists' relief. 'It is utterly impossible,'
wrote Sir Guy Carleton to Lord North, 'to leave exposed to the rage
and violence of these people [the Americans] men of character whose
only offence has been their attachment to the King's service.'
Accordingly the British government made amends for its betrayal of
the Loyalists by taking them under its wing. It arranged for the
transportation of all those who wished to leave the revolted states;
it offered them homes in the provinces of Nova Scotia and Quebec; it
granted half-pay to the officers after their regiments were reduced;
and it appointed a royal commission to provide compensation for the
losses sustained.
This site includes some historical materials that
may imply negative stereotypes reflecting the culture or language of
a particular period or place. These items are presented as part of
the historical record and should not be interpreted to mean that the
WebMasters in any way endorse the stereotypes implied.
Chronicles of Canada, The
United Empire Loyalists, A Chronicle of the Great Migration, 1915
Chronicles of Canada |